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Corporate Parents, Initial Legitimacy, and Resource
Acquisition in Small and Medium Firms:
An Empirical Examination
Gregory B. Murphy
Neil Tocher
mall and medium enterprises (SMEs) commonly
struggle to acquire needed financial, human, and
technological resources. The above being stated,
recent scholarly research argues that SMEs that are able to
successfully navigate the legitimacy threshold are better
able to gather the resources they need to survive and grow.
This article provides an empirical test of that claim by
examining whether the presence of a corporate parent positively influences SME resource acquisition. Results of the
study show that SMEs with corporate parents, when compared to like-sized independent SMEs, have higher credit
scores, have more complete management teams, use more
computers, and are more likely to be on the Internet. These
differences are most pronounced for very small firms and
diminish in significance as firm size increases. Study
implications include the notion that presence of a corporate parent likely represents a successful navigation of the
legitimacy threshold, positively increasing SME resource
acquisition.
Keywords: legitimacy threshold; parenting; new ventures;
resource acquisition

S

Scholars argue that before a new venture is able to gather the
resources it needs to survive and grow, it must first attain initial legitimacy from key stakeholders (Choi and Shepherd,
2005; Rutherford, Buller, and Stebbins, 2009). Thus, ventures
that are not granted legitimacy by key stakeholders (i.e. stakeholders with the potential to provide significant and steady
resources to the venture) will likely not be able to assemble
needed resources such as financing, human capital, and technological assets, dramatically increasing their chances of failure (Aldrich and Martinez, 2001; Shepherd and Zacharakis,
2003). This study provides an empirical test of the above
notion by examining whether SMEs with corporate parents
are better able to gather resources (i.e. financing, managerial
talent, technological assets) than SMEs without corporate
parents.

What Is Initial Legitimacy?
Initial legitimacy is “. . . a social judgment of acceptance,
appropriateness, and desirability, [that] enables organizations

to access other resources needed to survive and grow”
(Zimmerman and Zeitz, 2002). In this sense, key stakeholders—usually customers and financiers—grant initial legitimacy based on their assessment of both the entrepreneur and
the emerging venture (Aldrich and Fiol, 1994; Choi and
Shepherd, 2005). Once the stakeholder has determined that
the venture is a legitimate operation, the stakeholder will typically signal such a decision by providing the venture with
resources (Shepherd and Zacharakis, 2003). Once this signal
has been sent by a key stakeholder, other stakeholders will
realize that the venture is legitimate and will also provide
resources, allowing the venture to survive and grow
(Rutherford and Buller, 2007).
Attaining initial legitimacy is perhaps best described by
the idea of a legitimacy threshold (LT), which Zimmerman
and Zeitz (2002) define as “[the point] below which the new
venture struggles for existence and probably will perish and
above which the new venture can achieve further gains in
legitimacy and resources.” More specifically, researchers have
observed that entrepreneurs tell fairly similar “made it” stories about the point at which entrepreneurs felt their firms
had become commercially stable and were no longer
engaged in a daily fight for survival (e.g. Rutherford and
Buller, 2007; Zahra and Filatotchev, 2004). Such “made it stories” told by entrepreneurs typically involve the entrepreneur’s firm being endorsed—or legitimized—by a resourceproviding stakeholder (e.g. Choi and Shepherd, 2005;
Rutherford et al., 2009).

Why Should the LT be Empirically Examined?
While the above indicates that emerging ventures likely
experience the LT, few empirical studies have examined the
relationship between successful navigation of the LT and
small firm resource acquisition. In this article, we attempt to
bridge this gap by examining if the presence of a corporate
parent positively influences SME resource acquisition. In this
sense, we view the presence of a corporate parent as a successful navigation of the LT and seek to understand if successful navigation of the LT does indeed allow ventures to
attain needed resources.
Further, while there has been considerable debate in the
strategy literature on the effectiveness of corporate parent-
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ing efforts (i.e., Chang and Singh, 2000; McGahan and Porter,
1997), such research has focused little attention on the
effects parenting has on small subsidiary ventures (Brush and
Bromily, 1997). Rather, parenting research has typically
focused on the influence the practice has on the performance of large (often multinational) parent corporations.
Hence, by assessing the possibility that the presence of a corporate parent positively influences SME resource acquisition,
we contribute to the literature by providing an empirical
examination of the above knowledge gap.
To accomplish the goals of our study, we first review
research on the parenting effect, contrasting its influence to
the resource scarcity commonly faced by SMEs due to the liability of smallness (LOS). Given such liabilities, we then
explain the LT in detail, arguing that the presence of a corporate parent represents successful navigation of the LT and
will thus positively influence SME resource acquisition. We
use a comparison sample of 1,242 small subsidiaries and
2,099 independent small firms to test this notion before
reporting results and discussing implications.

The Parenting Effect
Corporate strategy effects can be divided into two components: industry choice and corporate parenting. Industry
choice refers to the idea that a firm may benefit from participating in industries that are more profitable than others.
Parenting, the focus of this article, refers to the idea that subsidiary firms may benefit by having a corporate “parent” or
owner. The primary benefit of corporate parenting is
increased access to both resources and managerial guidance
(Goold, Campbell, and Alexander, 1994).
The ability of corporate parenting to deliver increased
firm performance has been widely debated in the strategy
literature. Beginning with Schmalensee in 1985, scholars
have argued about the amount of positive benefits that parenting provides (Wernerfelt and Montgomery, 1988; Rumelt,
1991; Brush and Bromily, 1997; McGahan and Porter, 1997;
Chang and Singh, 2000). Specifically, Schmalensee (1985)
found significant parenting effects while Rumelt (1991)
found parenting effects to be trivial. Rumelt (1991) found
“no evidence of non-zero corporate [parenting] effects” (p.
178) in his first sample and a very small (2%) parenting
effect in his second sample. Subsequent research has found
that parenting effects are stronger in the wholesale and
retail sectors than in the manufacturing sector (McGahan
and Porter, 1997) and that parenting effects are stronger
when lines of business are defined more narrowly (Chang
and Singh, 2000). However, even these studies have generally found a fairly modest corporate parenting/firm performance relationship for the larger firms they examined.
McGahan and Porter (1997) found, for example, that “stable
effects for corporate-parent membership account for only

about 4 percent of the variance in business segment profit”
(p. 24).
This line of research, however, has focused on large firms
that have already overcome the LOS and the LT. Having successfully navigated the LT, the large subsidiary firms studied
in the existing literature are better able to acquire needed
resources on their own merits, reducing or eliminating the
importance of the parent as a resource provider. By comparison, we would expect that parenting effects will be more significant for emerging ventures, particularly with regard to
resource attainment.While larger subsidiaries may still benefit from a corporate parent’s managerial guidance, smaller
subsidiaries will likely benefit from both a parent’s managerial guidance as well as the parent’s ability to provide
resources that the SME would not likely be able to acquire on
its own.
Accordingly, while the literature as a whole suggests that
corporate parenting has a modest positive influence on firm
performance (e.g. Chang and Singh, 2000; McGahan and
Porter, 1997; Schmalensee, 1985), we argue that parenting
effects are likely to be more significant for emerging ventures
that are still subject to the LOS and have likely not yet successfully navigated the LT. Given this, we next argue that the
presence of a corporate parent suggests successful navigation of the LT and thus helps SMEs neutralize the LOS, which
will in turn allow the subsidiary to better gather needed
resources.

Corporate Parenting and the LT
In this article, we subscribe to the notion that most, if not all,
SMEs must navigate a legitimacy threshold before they are
able to acquire needed resources (Birley and Norburn, 1985;
Zahra and Filatotchev, 2004).The central idea of the LT is that
there exists a point in the early stage of most new ventures
where the firm compiles some base level of legitimacy that
enables it to survive and possibly grow (Zimmerman and
Zeitz, 2002). Therefore, pre-legitimate ventures can be clearly
contrasted with post-legitimate ventures in that they are just
getting off the ground, financed entirely by seed money, have
few (if any) substantial customers, and possess highly untenable resources; whereas post-legitimate ventures have
acquired, or have access to, additional and more stable
resources due to being granted at least a base level of legitimacy by a key stakeholder (Rutherford and Buller, 2007;
Rutherford et al., 2009). Navigation of the LT is thus comparable to overcoming the LOS, which is a condition where
emerging ventures possess limited power against market
forces due to a lack of resources (Stinchcombe, 1965). More
specifically, since emerging ventures commonly have limited
debt capacity, poor cash flows, a limited product/service
offering, and depend on niche markets, their survival and performance is more susceptible to market forces such as
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aggressive competitors, demand fluctuations, and powerful
suppliers (Choi and Shepherd, 2005; Morris, 2001).
In this sense, navigating the legitimacy threshold is largely
a resource issue (e.g., Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978), because
pre-legitimate ventures usually possess only the founder’s
personal resources and what the founder has been able to
raise from friends, family, and fools (Berger and Udell, 1998;
2006). Further, the pre-legitimate firm likely has few if any significant customers. Because of this resource deficiency, during the pre-legitimate stage, resource-providing stakeholders
(i.e., financiers and customers) are usually the most important stakeholders from whom the firm must be granted legitimacy (Choi and Shepherd, 2005).Therefore, successful navigation of the LT is most commonly indicated by the provision
of resources to the SME by a key stakeholder (Zimmerman
and Zeitz, 2002; Zahra and Filatotchev, 2004). For example,
post legitimacy may be indicated by events such as the SME
landing its first major sale, entering a licensing agreement
with a product distributor, or receiving financing from a business angel (Rutherford et al., 2009). While the above are all
certainly viable, we assert that several lines of reasoning support the notion that SMEs with corporate parents have also
successfully navigated the LT.
First, it is reasonable to assert that parent firms nearly
always invest in legitimate ventures. As posited by
Burgelman (1991) corporations have limited resources and
thus managers will only invest such resources after much
analysis. Hence, a parent/subsidiary relationship suggests
that the parent has performed due diligence and concluded
that the SME is legitimate (Lange, Boivie, and Henderson,
2009). Further, research in the large firm literature indicates
that parents consistently provide subsidiary ventures with
high levels of tangible resources (e.g. McKendrick and
Carroll, 2001; McKendrick, et al., 2003; Stuart, Hoang, and
Hybels, 1999), providing evidence that SMEs with corporate
parents will have more consistent access to resources than
independent SMEs. Finally, regardless of the amount of tangible resources that the SME acquires from the parent, the parent’s presence will likely signal to other potential resource
providers that the SME is more legitimate than comparable
independent ventures (Aldrich and Martinez, 2001;
Shepherd and Zacharakis, 2003).Thus, we conclude that the
presence of a corporate parent represents a successful navigation of the LT and will thus enhance SME resource acquisition.
Given the above, we posit the following:
Hypothesis 1: Corporate parents will positively influence SME resource acquisition such that SMEs with
corporate parents will gather more resources than
SMEs without corporate parents.

Corporate Parents and SME Resource
Acquisition
As acknowledged above, SMEs struggle to acquire needed
resources, particularly in the areas of human capital (Hornsby
and Kuratko, 2003), financing (Berger and Udell, 2006), and
technological assets (Bernadas and Verville, 2005).
Conversely, research on the LT provides evidence that SMEs
which are granted legitimacy by a critical stakeholder will be
better able to acquire needed resources (Rutherford and
Buller, 2007; Zimmerman and Zeitz, 2002). Given that the
presence of a corporate parent likely greatly increases SME
legitimacy, we argue below that SMEs with corporate parents
will have better access to technological, financial, and human
resources than similar ventures that lack parents.

Acquiring Financing
It is well documented that new and small firms struggle to
acquire needed financing and such struggles are a common
cause of SME failure (e.g., Coleman, 2004; Gregory,
Rutherford, Oswald, and Gardiner, 2005). Further, research
also documents that to acquire financing; entrepreneurs
often face additional constraints such as higher interest rates,
weekly payments, and extensive personal guarantees (Barton
and Matthews, 1989; Rutherford, Coombes, and Tocher, 2007).
While SMEs struggle to raise capital for a variety of reasons,
two primary causes are the fact that financiers often face
severe information opacity with regard to the SME and the
reality that SME financing is highly dependent on its
founders’ credit scores (Berger and Udell, 1998; 2006). More
specifically, since the SME has few assets and often lacks the
solid business reputation that creditors desire, the SME’s
credit score will either rely heavily or be entirely dependent
upon its founders’ credit scores (Brewer, 2007).
Therefore, we argue here that the presence of a corporate
parent will help SMEs limit their information opacity and
increase their credit score. For example, a parent will likely
have a long and hopefully sound business record, which
potential creditors will almost certainly reference when making loan decisions regarding the parent’s subsidiaries (Lange
et al., 2009; McKendrick, et al., 2003). In other words, while
the SME may lack legitimacy and reputation, the parent will
likely possess high levels of each, which a potential financier
will most likely consider when deciding whether to provide
financing to the parent’s subsidiary. Such perceived legitimacy is presumed to positively influence the SME’s ability to
raise capital (Zimmerman and Zeitz, 2002). Further and perhaps more important, the presence of a parent will link the
SME’s credit score with the parent’s credit score (Berger and
Udell, 2006). Since it is almost certain that the parent’s credit score will be higher and have more credence than the
SME’s credit score, a parent will likely positively influence
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SME access to capital. Given the above discussion, the following is advanced:
Hypothesis 2: The presence of a corporate parent will
positively influence SME access to financing such that
SMEs with a parent will have higher credit scores than
comparable ventures without parents.

Acquiring Managerial Talent
The acquisition of a qualified management team is a complex
issue for SMEs. On one hand, SMEs commonly struggle to
attract and retain the qualified employees they desire, yet on
the other hand, attracting and retaining competent employees is critically important to SME survival and performance
(Cardon and Stevens, 2004; Tocher and Rutherford, 2009).
Emphasizing the above statement, research indicates that
managerial incompetence is one of the most common reasons for SME failure (Dun & Bradstreet, 2001), yet emerging
ventures typically place very little emphasis on formal HRM
practices (Hornsby and Kuratko, 1990; 2003) and generally
report not being able to attract competent employees
(Williamson, 2000; Williamson, Cable, and Aldrich, 2002).
Additional research indicates that SMEs (1) rely extensively
on personal networks to find employees (e.g., Carroll,
Marchington, Earnshaw, and Taylor, 1999), (2) use few if any
formalized selection practices such as structured interviews,
reference checks, or formal job applications (e.g., Kotey and
Slade, 2005), and (3) often must compensate key employees
at below market levels (Hayton, 2003). Further, due to factors
such as a lack of training, limited promotion opportunities,
and poor or absent supervision, SMEs often are unable to
retain the few qualified employees they are able to attract
(Tocher, Shook, and Giles, 2007).
While the above indicates that SMEs struggle to attract and
select employees, research also suggests that the presence of
a parent will likely help neutralize such challenges. For
instance, the presence of a parent will significantly increase
employer legitimacy (e.g.,Williamson et al., 2002), positively
influencing such factors as applicant pool quality, perceived
promotion opportunity, and employee competence (Cardon
and Stevens, 2004). Next, parent firms will almost certainly
follow more formalized HRM practices than independent
SME ventures (Kotey and Slade, 2005), and will probably
require their subsidiaries to use similar practices. Using more
formal HRM practices will likely result in more competent
employees and better employee retention. Illustrating this
point, research indicates that the use of formal HRM practices such as strict recruiting and selection practices, formal
training programs, and employee empowerment initiatives
tend to positively influence SME performance while decreasing turnover (e.g. Chandler and McEvoy, 2000; Hayton, 2003;
Tocher and Rutherford, 2009). Finally, since parents tend to

highly subsidize subsidiary ventures (McKendrick et al.,
2003), it follows that such support will allow SMEs with parents to better compensate employees, neutralizing the pay
gap often faced by SME ventures (Lange et al., 2009). Hence,
the following is posited:
Hypothesis 3: The presence of a corporate parent will
positively influence SME access to managerial talent
such that SMEs with a parent will have more complete
management teams than comparable ventures without
parents.

Acquiring Technology
The acquisition and utilization of technology is also a doubleedged sword for SME ventures in that SMEs are often technological laggards (e.g. Bernadas and Verville, 2005), yet the use
of technology is critical to establishing and maintaining the
knowledge-based competitive advantages that are critically
important in the global economy (Felin and Hesterly, 2007).
SMEs often possess less technological assets than more established ventures for reasons such as a lack of capital to purchase technology (e.g. Robeiro and Love, 2003), fear that purchasing such items will hurt the firm’s strategic flexibility
(e.g. Murphy, Celuch, and Callaway, 2007), and a belief by SME
managers that their ventures do not have enough competent
employees to leverage the technology their firms already possess (e.g. Litz and Stewart, 2000). Given such concerns, SMEs
often choose to either outsource certain technological functions or rely on strategic partnerships to accomplish such
activities (Stam and Elfring, 2008).
Given the technological challenges often faced by SMEs, it
seems that the presence of a corporate parent is a viable strategic
partnering option for emerging firms attempting to leverage technological resources.Specifically,a parent will probably provide the
SME the financing, competent employees, and training needed to
acquire and use the latest technologies (McKendrick and Carroll,
2001; McKendrick et al., 2003). Similarly, a parent will likely allow
its subsidiaries to access the technologies that the parent already
possesses (Lange et al., 2009). Integrating the subsidiary’s knowledge management systems into the parent’s systems will usually
benefit the subsidiary by providing it access to the parent’s suppliers,customers,and partners (Lubit,2001).Finally,the presence of a
parent will help the subsidiary convince stakeholders such as customers and suppliers that any proprietary technologies it possesses are legitimate (Murphy and Smart,2000).Supporting this notion,
legitimacy scholars (e.g., Tornikoski and Newbert, 2007; Delmar
and Shane, 2004) argue that communicating an association with a
larger and better known organization such as a parent typically
leads potential stakeholders to infer greater legitimacy on the proprietary resources of an emerging venture.Hence,we advance the
following:
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resource talent. Reference USA lists up to 21 executives
(including the primary firm contact) for each firm. Number
of executives was measured as the total number of executives listed for each firm. The number of executives per firm
ranged from 1 to 11 in the samples.
The presence of a website and the number of PCs were
used as measures of technology use in this study. Reference
USA lists the firm’s URL if a website is available. Developing
and maintaining a website can require extensive knowledge
of computer-related technology, especially if the website has
to be frequently updated and is used to take and place
orders online. Firms with websites were coded with a 1
while firms without a website were coded with a 0.
Reference USA lists the number of PCs in a firm by category. Firms with 0–1 PCs were coded with 1; firms with 2–9
PCs, 2; firms with 10–29 PCs, 3; and firms with 30 or more
PCs, 4. Reference USA does not report data on number of
PCs for firms with 100 or more employees. Retailers use PCs
for a variety of purposes such as inventory and customer
database management. Increased use of PCs represents a
commitment to using technology to perform functions that
may otherwise be performed manually.
Subsidiary status was coded with a 1 if the firm had a corporate parent and with a 0 if the company was independently owned. Two control variables were included in the study.
First, number of employees was included as a measure of firm
size. Larger firms can be expected to have greater resources,
making controlling for firm size important. Reference USA
provides data on number of employees in size groupings:
firms with 0–4 employees were coded 1; 5–9 employees, 2;
10–19 employees, 3; 20–49 employees, 4; 50–99 employees,
5; 100–249 employees, 6; and 250–499 employees, 7. Firm age
was the second control variable used. It is likely that older
firms, like larger firms, have better access to resources, making controlling for firm age appropriate.The year the company first used a yellow page ad was used as a proxy for firm
age.While an imperfect measure of firm age, retail firms have
a strong interest in being listed in local yellow pages.

Hypothesis 4: The presence of a corporate parent will
positively influence SME utilization of technological
resources such that SMEs with a parent will acquire
and utilize more technological resources than comparable ventures without parents.

Method
Data for the study were gathered from Reference USA.
Reference USA claims to report data on more than 14 million
businesses in the United States. To identify a sample of small
subsidiaries, data on nongovernment, nonbranch, and nonheadquarter subsidiary retail firms with less than 500
employees were gathered. A total of 1,242 such firms were
identified. Retail firms were chosen because McGahan and
Porter (1997) noted that corporate (parenting)-level effects
are strongest in retail and wholesale industries. To identify a
comparative sample, random names were chosen and used as
street names to identify nongovernment, nonbranch, nonheadquarter, and nonsubsidiary, single location independent
retail firms with less than 500 employees.This process identified 2,099 such firms. In general, subsidiary firms were larger than independent firms. Accordingly, tests for significant
mean differences were conducted for the full sample as well
as for each variable of interest by firm size (number of
employees).
Credit numeric score was used to measure the firm’s ability to access financial capital. Higher credit scores make it
easier to attain working capital and debt financing on superior terms. Higher credit scores should also result in improved
ability to access equity markets on superior terms.The confidence of financiers in a firm’s ability to meet its financial obligations is reflected in a firm’s credit score. This increased
confidence should coincide with financiers’ perceptions of
reduced risk, thereby reducing the rate of return demanded
by equity investors. Credit numeric scores in the samples
range from 26 to 100.
Number of executives was used to measure the firm’s ability to successfully recruit and retain important human

Table 1. Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations
Mean
1. # Employees

Std.

1

2

3

4

5

6

3.62

1.90

1996.51

7.26

**-.18

.37

.48

**.23

-.01

4. Credit Score

88.66

11.92

**.47

**-.40

**.48

5. # Executives

2.13

1.93

**.52

**-.10

**.22

**.28

.36

.48

**.40

**-.09

**.27

**.30

**.36

1.70

.71

**.67

**-.12

**.37

**.39

**.40

2. Firm Age
3. Subsidiary

6.Website
7. #PCs

**.40

**=sig. at .01
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Results
Analysis proceeded in three stages. First, variable descriptive
data and correlations are presented in Table 1.Table 1 shows
that the two control variables firm size and firm age are significantly correlated with most of the other variables in the
study, indicating the appropriateness of their inclusion. The
table also shows that subsidiary status is significantly and
positively related to all of the variables of interest, suggesting
that having a corporate parent leads to higher credit scores,
a more complete management team, and better access to
technology.
In the second stage, subsidiary status was regressed on
credit score, number of executives, presence of a website,
and the number of personal computers, using firm size and
firm age as control variables. Table 2 shows the results of the
two-step regressions. The results show that subsidiary status
significantly improves the prediction of credit scores, number of executives, the likelihood of a website, and the number of personal computers employed, given controls for firm
size and firm age. These results indicate that having a corporate parent significantly improves a small firms’ ability to
acquire important resources.
In the final stage of analysis, tests of significant mean differences between the subsidiary sample and the independent firms sample were conducted. Differences are tested for
the seven size groupings ranging from 0–4 employees to
250–499 employees. Table 3 reports the results of the analysis. These results are offered to more fully illustrate the differences between small independent and small subsidiary firms
in their ability to acquire important resources, and to assess
the extent that the legitimacy benefits of having a corporate
Table 2. Regression of Subsidiary Status on Credit
Scores, Number of Executives, Presence of a Website,
and Number of Personal Computers
Credit
Score

# Executives

Website

# PCs

Stage 1
Number of
Employees

***.41

***.52

***.40

***.68

Firm Age

***-.34

-.01

-.02

.01

***.40

***.09

***.18

***.17

***1040.47
.48

***432.49
.28

***259.52
.19

***783.33
.48

***.16

***.01

***.03

***.03

Stage 2
Subsidiary
Status
F
Adjusted R2
Significant
Change in R2

***=sig. at .001
Standardized regression coefficients reported
F and Adjusted R2 are for Stage 2 Models

parent are more pronounced for smaller firms.
Table 3 reveals frequent and consistent differences in
resource levels between the subsidiary and independent
firms. Regarding credit scores, subsidiary firms had higher
credit scores than independent firms in the total sample as
well as every size group. The greatest differences were found
for smaller firms. Subsidiary firms with 0–4 employees had
credit scores 20.24 points higher, on average, than comparably sized independent firms. By comparison, subsidiary firms
with 100–249 employees had credit scores only 4.03 points
higher, on average, than same-sized independent firms.
Regarding number of executives, subsidiary firms employed
more executives than independent firms in the total sample
and in each size group except the largest group of firms with
250–499 employees. The most significant difference was
again found in the smallest subsamples of firms with 0–4
employees. Regarding technology availability, subsidiary
firms were much more likely to have a website than independent firms for the sample overall and for each size group
except the largest group of firms with 250–499 employees.
Here again, the greatest differences were observed for smaller firms. Subsidiaries with 0–4 employees were 9 times as
likely as independent firms to have a website while subsidiaries with 5–9 and 10–19 employees were respectively
almost 4 and 2 times more likely to have a website. Also, subsidiary firms used more PCs than independent firms for the
overall sample and for each size group except the group with
5–9 employees.
Collectively, the results of the analyses provide strong support for the hypotheses. The general hypothesis (hypothesis
1) that SMEs with corporate parents will gather more
resources than independent businesses was well supported
by the data. The correlation data shows consistently greater
resources for subsidiaries than independent firms.The regression analysis shows that this finding remains when controlling for firm size and firm age. Hypothesis 2, that small subsidiaries will have higher credit scores than independent
small businesses is also strongly supported by the data. Table
2 shows a large (.16) and significant improvement in percentage of variance explained in credit scores as a result of
including subsidiary status in the regression. Hypothesis 3,
that small subsidiaries will have more complete management
teams than independent small businesses, was also strongly
supported by the data. Firm size, as measured by number of
employees, was revealed in Table 2 to be the more significant
control variable (firm age was not a significant predictor
when firm size was included in the model). Table 3 revealed
that subsidiary firms had more complete management teams
than independent firms for the overall sample, as well as for
every size subsample except the largest with 250–499
employees. Hypothesis 4, that small subsidiaries will make
greater use of technology than independent small business-
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es, was also strongly supported by the data.These variables,
like number of executives, were strongly influenced by firm
size (and not firm age) as a control variable. Again, Table 3
Table 3. Mean Differences Between Small
Independent and Subsidiary Retail Firms
Independent Subsidiary
Total Sample
Credit Score

N=1242
96.07

***991.61

1.80

2.67

***164.66

.26

.52

***258.37

Number of Executives
Presence of Website
Number of PCs
0–4 Employees
Credit Score

1.50

2.06

***415.88

N=674
76.42

N=82
95.66

***357.45

1.00

1.21

***57.70

.03

.27

***85.05

Number of Executives
Presence of Website
Number of PCs
5–9 Employees
Credit Score

F

N=2099
84.27

1.06

1.18

***18.20

N=203
79.69

N=116
95.05

***181.60

1.00

1.26

***18.54

.07

.27

***23.90

Number of Executives
Presence of Website
Number of PCs

1.45

1.55

2.58

N=170
81.77

N=180
95.77

***191.96

1.08

1.37

**9.16

.24

.47

***21.60

1.35

1.86

***51.50

N=472
89.33

N=318
96.85

***158.90

1.98

2.23

**7.64

.38

.53

***19.54

2.05

2.29

***48.40

N=121
90.73

N=217
96.40

***25.11

2.51

3.12

**8.29

.49

.67

***11.48

2.05

2.47

***28.44

100–249 Employees
Credit Score

N=403
91.88

N=235
95.91

***28.08

Number of Executives

3.19

4.34

***28.41

10–19 Employees
Credit Score
Number of Executives
Presence of Website
Number of PCs
20–49 Employees
Credit Score
Number of Executives
Presence of Website
Number of PCs
50–99 Employees
Credit Score
Number of Executives
Presence of Website
Number of PCs

Presence of Website

.49

.59

**6.63

N/A

N/A

N/A

250–499 Employees
Credit Score

N=56
91.73

N=72
97.10

***11.60

Number of Executives

3.57

4.17

1.34

Number of PCs

Presence of Website
Number of PCs
**=sig. at .01, ***=sig. at .001

.57

.60

.77

N/A

N/A

N/A

illustrates that subsidiary firms were much more likely to
have a website and employ more personal computers in their
firms than their independent counterparts.
These findings support the general hypothesis that the
presence of a parent will positively influence SME resource
acquisition. Such findings lend support to the argument that
the presence of a parent represents a successful navigation of
the LT. Further, findings that the smaller subsidiaries had considerably more resources than comparable independent ventures and such resource differences declined as firms became
more established (see Table 3) provide support for the notion
that parenting may be most beneficial for pre-legitimate ventures.

Discussion
The current study provides solid empirical support for the
notion that the presence of a parent will positively influence
resource acquisition in emerging ventures. Specifically, our
findings indicate that small subsidiary ventures typically have
better credit ratings, have more managers, have more personal computers, and are more likely to have a website than
comparably sized independent ventures. It should also be
noted that such resource differences are most pronounced in
very small firms and become less pronounced as firms
become more established. Such findings indicate that while
all SMEs with parents tend to be able to gather more
resources than comparable ventures, the access to resources
benefit of parenting appears to be far greater for smaller ventures.
The above findings make several important contributions
to the literature. First, our article extends research on corporate parenting by examining its influence on SMEs. As previously mentioned, most research on corporate parenting
effects tends to examine large, well-established ventures and
has typically concluded that parenting benefits are generally
marginal for such firms (e.g. Chang and Singh, 2000;
McGahan and Porter, 1997). For example, recent work by
Lange et al. (2009) even found that subsidiaries of corporate
parents have higher failure rates than independently owned
ventures. However, it should be noted that since established
ventures have much better access to resources, the main benefit of parenting for large subsidiary ventures is the provision
of managerial oversight from the parent to the subsidiary
(Goold et al., 1994). Conversely, considering that emerging
ventures tend to lack both legitimacy and tangible resources
(Williamson, 2000), a parent may provide emerging ventures
with additional benefits such as increasing the SME’s perceived legitimacy and access to resources. Interestingly, our
data supports the above by finding both that SMEs with parents tend to gather more resources than independent firms,
and that such resource differences were most pronounced
for smaller firms. Such findings suggest that parenting pro-
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vides SMEs increased access to resources and this increased
access is greatest for smaller firms. Therefore, parenting does
appear to be more beneficial for emerging ventures.
Second, our article provides needed empirical evidence to
support the legitimacy threshold (LT) concept.While recent
work provides solid evidence that the LT exists and that successfully navigating the LT is critical to firm survival (Choi
and Shepherd, 2005; Rutherford and Buller, 2007;
Zimmerman and Zeitz, 2002), empirical studies demonstrating critical differences between comparable pre-legitimate
and post-legitimate firms are rare (Rutherford et al., 2009;
Zahra and Filatotchev, 2004). Hence, by demonstrating that
SMEs that have successfully crossed the LT by bringing on a
corporate parent are better able to gather resources than
comparable ventures, we provide additional empirical support for the LT concept and suggest that attracting a corporate parent is a viable option which may help entrepreneurs
successfully navigate the LT.
Third, our study suggests that bringing on a corporate parent will help entrepreneurs operating early-stage ventures
avoid the risky strategy of prioritizing stakeholder concerns.
Several studies (e.g. Danov, Smith, and Mitchell, 2003; Jawahar
and McLauphlin, 2001; Tocher and Rutherford, 2009) conclude that entrepreneurs operating early-stage ventures typically prioritize stakeholder concerns, paying most (if not all)
of their attention to the concerns of resource-providing
stakeholders—usually customers and financiers. At the same
time, such entrepreneurs pay little if any attention to the concerns of stakeholders such as employees, suppliers, and community officials. However, such a strategy has also been
shown to be problematic as research indicates that firms
who address stakeholder concerns in a symbiotic manner
tend to experience high performance levels (e.g. Bosse,
Phillips, and Harrison, 2009; Laplume, Sonpar, and Litz, 2008).
For instance, research by Dyer and Singh (1998) found that
firms that are able to develop symbiotic relationships among
various stakeholder groups typically experience higher performance levels than comparable firms who use primarily a
zero sum approach to stakeholder management. Jawahar and
Mclaughlin’s (2001) argument for stakeholder prioritization
is primarily based on the notion that emerging ventures must
gather resources before all stakeholder interests can be
aligned. However, if the presence of a parent allows emerging
firms to gather needed resources, it seems that subsidiaries
will be able to align stakeholder interests earlier in the venture’s existence and avoid the risky stakeholder prioritization
strategy.
Finally, in spite of the benefits of parenting discussed
above, our results also suggest that entrepreneurs need to be
aware of the LT when deciding to enter into a parenting subsidiary relationship. While parents typically increase emerging ventures’ perceived legitimacy and access to resources, it

can be assumed that ventures which have crossed the LT are
seen as legitimate and are thus able to gather resources with
or without the help of a parent (Aldrich and Martinez, 2001;
Shepherd and Zacharakis, 2003). Therefore, similar to large
established firms, the primary benefit that post-legitimate
ventures will receive from parents is managerial guidance
(Goold et al., 1994). Given the mixed results of research
examining the parenting/firm performance relationship (e.g.
Chang and Singh, 2000), an entrepreneur operating a postlegitimate venture should be very cautious when making the
decision to enter into a parenting subsidiary relationship. If
the entrepreneur believes that the firm could benefit substantially from the increased managerial guidance of a parent,
she should consider the subsidiary option. However, if the
entrepreneur believes that her management team can effectively guide the venture, she should think twice about bringing a parent on board.

Limitations and Future Research
This study, like any, has limitations. One limitation of this
study was the unavailability of performance data. While our
results do show that small subsidiaries have better access to
important resources than independent small businesses, this
study is not able to determine if improved access to
resources, in this case, results in performance improvements
for parents or their subsidiaries. Future research should consider the relationship between emerging venture legitimization by a parent and emerging firm performance. Specifically,
do SMEs who are legitimized by corporate parents experience higher performance levels than comparably sized independent firms? On one hand, it seems that both the increased
access to resources and the managerial oversight provided by
the parent would allow the subsidiary to perform at a higher
level. However, recent empirical research by Lange et al.
(2009) actually indicates that corporate subsidiaries experience higher failure rates than comparable ventures. Given
such findings, future research needs to examine whether subsidiaries do indeed perform at lower levels. Conversely, could
it be that subsidiary ventures are more likely to fail because
parents have unrealistic expectations and tend to pull
resources from subsidiaries before they are able to fully
develop their product/service offerings?
On a related note, it would be interesting to examine if
parental managerial oversight creates a reality where subsidiary ventures are not as diversified as comparably sized
independent firms. It is certainly possible that the corporate
parent may prefer that the subsidiary focus their efforts narrowly, especially if the subsidiary is a supplier or distributor
of the parent’s products or services. Studies indicating that
independent ventures that are more diversified tend to perform at higher levels than subsidiaries that are only allowed
to carry a narrow product line may provide some explana-
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tion for Lange et al.’s (2009) somewhat contrary findings.
Next, research should examine if performance levels vary for
SME subsidiaries across the LT. In other words, do pre-legitimate SMEs that become subsidiaries experience better survival rates and higher performance levels than post-legitimate SMEs who become subsidiaries after crossing the LT?
Research indicating that SMEs that used the legitimization of
a parent to navigate the LT perform at higher levels than
SMEs that became affiliated with parents after crossing the LT
would provide additional credence to the claim that entrepreneurs operating post-legitimate ventures should be cautious about entering into a parenting subsidiary relationship.
Further, it is important to note that our study suggests a
strategy for emerging firms (i.e. courting the support of a parent) that will likely lead to reduced independence for entrepreneurs. As many entrepreneurs value independence, an indepth study of entrepreneurs’ personal experiences with
becoming and being a subsidiary may help inform other
entrepreneurs as to their potential satisfaction with such an
arrangement.
Finally, this study was rough-grained in its approach.
Future research could adopt a more fine-grained approach
and add insight into the legitimization process and to a variety of possible differences between subsidiary and independent firms. For example, future research might consider the
extent that small subsidiaries use their websites more to
coordinate business activities, while small independent firms
use their websites primarily to create firm awareness.

Conclusion
The current examination of resource acquisition benefits of

corporate parenting in SMEs contributes to the literature by
finding that parenting is highly beneficial for smaller, less
established ventures. Using a comparison sample of 1,242
small subsidiaries and 2,099 independent small firms, we
found strong evidence that the presence of a parent allows
SMEs increased access to resources. Perhaps more importantly though, our findings also indicate that as firm size increases, resource differences between subsidiary and comparable
independent ventures tend to steadily decrease, leading to
the conclusion that parenting is likely much more beneficial
for pre-legitimate ventures. Thus, it appears that the presence
of a parent represents a successful navigation of the LT and
supports the notion that since entrepreneurs operating subsidiary ventures will be able to access needed resources, they
will be less likely to rely on the risky strategy of prioritizing
stakeholder concerns. However, given previous research findings indicating that parenting’s influence on performance is
typically marginal (e.g. Chang and Singh, 2000), and possibly
even negative (e.g. Lange et al., 2009), we submit that despite
the increased resource access typically provided to SMEs by
a parent firm, entrepreneurs operating post-legitimate ventures may not want to enter a parenting subsidiary relationship. Given that pre-legitimate ventures lack reputation and
are typically in need of resources (Aldrich, 1999), our results
suggest that pre-legitimate ventures should consider actively
pursuing a parent. However, since post-legitimate ventures
are likely able to access resources with or without the help
of a parent, entrepreneurs operating post-legitimate ventures
should only bring a parent on board if the entrepreneur is
convinced that the parent’s managerial oversight will
increase her firm’s performance.
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